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Abstract—Face recognition is a mainstream biometric
authentication method. However, vulnerability to presenta-
tion attacks (a.k.a spoofing) limits its usability in unsuper-
vised applications. Even though there are many methods
available for tackling presentation attacks (PA), most of
them fail to detect sophisticated attacks such as silicone
masks. As the quality of presentation attack instruments
improves over time, achieving reliable PA detection with
visual spectra alone remains very challenging. We argue
that analysis in multiple channels might help to address
this issue. In this context, we propose a multi-channel
Convolutional Neural Network based approach for pre-
sentation attack detection (PAD). We also introduce the
new Wide Multi-Channel presentation Attack (WMCA)
database for face PAD which contains a wide variety of 2D
and 3D presentation attacks for both impersonation and
obfuscation attacks. Data from different channels such as
color, depth, near-infrared and thermal are available to
advance the research in face PAD. The proposed method
was compared with feature-based approaches and found to
outperform the baselines achieving an ACER of 0.3% on
the introduced dataset. The database and the software to
reproduce the results are made available publicly.
Index Terms—Presentation attack detection, Convolu-
tional neural network, Biometrics, Face recognition, Anti-
spoofing, Multi-channel sensors.
I. INTRODUCTION
B IOMETRICS offers a secure and convenient wayfor access control. Face biometrics is one of the
most convenient modalities for biometric authentica-
tion due to its non-intrusive nature. Even though face
recognition systems are reaching human performance in
identifying persons in many challenging datasets [1],
most face recognition systems are still vulnerable to
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Fig. 1: Figure showing bonafide, print and replay attacks
from different PAD databases, Replay-Attack [5] (first
row), Replay-Mobile [6] (second row), and MSU-MFSD
[7] (third row).
presentation attacks (PA), also known as spoofing 1
attacks [2], [3]. Merely presenting a printed photo to
an unprotected face recognition system could be enough
to fool it [4]. Vulnerability to presentation attacks limits
the reliable deployment of such systems for applications
in unsupervised conditions.
As per the ISO standard [3], presentation attack is
defined as “a presentation to the biometric data capture
subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation
of the biometric system”. Presentation attacks include
both ‘impersonation’ as well as ‘obfuscation’ of iden-
tity. The ‘impersonation’ refers to attacks in which the
attacker wants to be recognized as a different person,
whereas in ‘obfuscation’ attacks, the objective is to hide
the identity of the attacker. The biometric characteristic
or object used in a presentation attack is known as
presentation attack instrument (PAI).
1The term spoofing should be deprecated in favour of presentation
attacks to comply with the ISO standards.
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2Different kinds of PAIs can be used to attack face
recognition systems. The presentation of a printed photo,
or replaying a video of a subject, are common examples
of 2D PAI which have been extensively explored in the
available literature. Examples of bonafide and 2D PAs
from publicly available databases are shown in Fig. 1.
More sophisticated attacks could involve manufacturing
custom 3D masks which correspond to a target identity
for impersonation or to evade identification. For reliable
usage of face recognition technology, it is necessary to
develop presentation attack detection (PAD) systems to
detect such PAs automatically.
The majority of available research deals with the de-
tection of print and replay attacks using visible spectral
data. Most of the methods relies on the limitations of
PAIs and quality degradation of the recaptured sample.
Features such as color, texture [8], [9], motion [4], and
physiological cues [10], [11] are often leveraged for PAD
in images from visible spectrum.
While it is useful to have visible spectrum image based
PAD algorithms for legacy face recognition systems, we
argue that using only visual spectral information may not
be enough for the detection of sophisticated attacks and
generalization to new unseen PAIs. The quality of pre-
sentation attack instruments (PAI) evolves together with
advances in cameras, display devices, and manufacturing
methods. Tricking a multi-channel system is harder than
a visual spectral one. An attacker would have to mimic
real facial features across different representations. The
PAD approaches which work in existing PAD databases
may not work in real-world conditions when encountered
with realistic attacks. Complementary information from
multiple channels could improve the accuracy of PAD
systems.
The objective of this work is to develop a PAD frame-
work which can detect a variety of 2D and 3D attacks
in obfuscation or impersonation settings. To this end,
we propose the new Multi-Channel Convolutional Neural
Network (MC-CNN) architecture, efficiently combining
multi-channel information for robust detection of presen-
tation attacks. The proposed network uses a pre-trained
LightCNN model as the base network, which obviates
the requirement to train the framework from scratch. In
the proposed MC-CNN only low-level LightCNN fea-
tures across multiple channels are re-trained, while high-
level layers of pre-trained LightCNN remain unchanged.
Databases containing a wide variety of challenging
PAIs are essential for developing and benchmarking PAD
algorithms. In this context, we introduce a Wide Multi-
Channel presentation Attack (WMCA) dataset, which
contains a broad variety of 2D and 3D attacks. The data
split and evaluation protocols are predefined and publicly
available. The algorithms, baselines, and the results are
reproducible. The software and models to reproduce the
results are available publicly 2.
The main contributions from this paper are listed
below.
• We propose a novel framework for face presenta-
tion attack detection based on multi-channel CNN
(MC-CNN). MC-CNN uses a face recognition sub-
network, namely LightCNN, making the framework
reusable for both PAD and face recognition. The
source codes for the network and instructions to
train the model are made publicly available al-
lowing to reproduce the findings. We benchmark
the proposed method against selected reproducible
baseline available in recent publications on the
topic [12], as well as reimplementations of recent
literature in multi-channel PAD [13]. We demon-
strate that the multi-channel approach is beneficial
in both proposed and baseline systems.
• The new WMCA database is introduced: the sub-
jects in the database are captured using multi-
ple capturing devices/channels, and the MC data
is spatially and temporally aligned. The channels
present are color, depth, thermal and infrared. The
database contains a wide variety of 2D and 3D pre-
sentation attacks, specifically, 2D print and replay
attacks, mannequins, paper masks, silicone masks,
rigid masks, transparent masks, and non-medical
eyeglasses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 revisits available literature related to face presenta-
tion attack detection. Section 3 presents the proposed
approach. The details about the sensors and the dataset
are described in section 4. Experimental procedure fol-
lowed, and the baseline systems are described in Section
5. Extensive testing and evaluations of the proposed
approach, along with comparisons with the baselines,
discussions, and limitations of the proposed approach are
presented in Section 6. Conclusions and future directions
are described in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORK
Most of the work related to face presentation attack
detection addresses detection of 2D attacks, specifically
print and 2D replay attacks. A brief review of recent
PAD methods is given in this section.
A. Feature based approaches for face PAD
For PAD using visible spectrum images, several meth-
ods such as detecting motion patterns [4], color texture,
and histogram based methods in different color spaces,
and variants of Local Binary Patterns (LBP) in grayscale
2Source code available at: https://gitlab.idiap.ch/bob/bob.paper.
mccnn.tifs2018
3TABLE I: Recent multi-channel face PAD datasets
Database Year Samples Attacks Channels SynchronousCapture
3DMAD [14] 2013 17 subjects 3D: Mask attacks Color and depth 3
I2BVSD [15] 2013 75 subjects 3D: Facial disguises Color and thermal —
GUC-LiFFAD [16] 2015 80 subjects 2D: Print and replay Light-field imagery 3
MS-Spoof [17] 2016 21 subjects 2D: Print Color and NIR (800nm) 3
BRSU [18] 2016 50+ subjects 3D: Masks, facial disguise Color & 4 SWIR bands 3
EMSPAD [19] 2017 50 subjects 2D: Print(laser &Inkjet) 7-band multi-spectral data 3
MLFP [20] 2017 10 subjects 3D: Obfuscation with la-
tex masks
Visible, NIR and thermal
bands
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[8] and color images [5], [9], have shown good perfor-
mance. Image quality based features [21] is one of the
successful feature based methods available in prevailing
literature. Methods identifying moire´ patterns [22], and
image distortion analysis [7], use the alteration of the
images due to the replay artifacts. Most of these methods
treat PAD as a binary classification problem which may
not generalize well for unseen attacks [12].
Chingovska et al. [23] studied the amount of client-
specific information present in features used for PAD.
They used this information to build client-specific PAD
methods. Their method showed a 50% relative improve-
ment and better performance in unseen attack scenarios.
Arashloo et al. [24] proposed a new evaluation scheme
for unseen attacks. Authors have tested several combina-
tions of binary classifiers and one class classifiers. The
performance of one class classifiers was better than bi-
nary classifiers in the unseen attack scenario. BSIF-TOP
was found successful in both one class and two class
scenarios. However, in cross-dataset evaluations, image
quality features were more useful. Nikisins et al. [12]
proposed a similar one class classification framework
using one class Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM). In
the feature extraction stage, they used a combination of
Image Quality Measures (IQM). The experimental part
involved an aggregated database consisting of replay at-
tack [5], replay mobile [6], and MSU-MFSD [7] datasets.
Heusch and Marcel [25], [11] recently proposed a
method for using features derived from remote photo-
plethysmography (rPPG). They used the long term spec-
tral statistics (LTSS) of pulse signals obtained from avail-
able methods for rPPG extraction. The LTSS features
were combined with SVM for PA detection. Their ap-
proach obtained better performance than state of the art
methods using rPPG in four publicly available databases.
B. CNN based approaches for face PAD
Recently, several authors have reported good per-
formance in PAD using convolutional neural networks
(CNN). Gan et al. [26] proposed a 3D CNN based ap-
proach, which utilized the spatial and temporal features
of the video. The proposed approach achieved good
results in the case of 2D attacks, prints, and videos.
Yang et al. [27] proposed a deep CNN architecture for
PAD. A preprocessing stage including face detection
and face landmark detection is used before feeding the
images to the CNN. Once the CNN is trained, the
feature representation obtained from CNN is used to
train an SVM classifier and used for final PAD task.
Boulkenafet et al. [28] summarized the performance of
the competition on mobile face PAD. The objective was
to evaluate the performance of the algorithms under real-
world conditions such as unseen sensors, different illu-
mination, and presentation attack instruments. In most of
the cases, texture features extracted from color channels
performed the best. Li et al. [29] proposed a 3D CNN
architecture, which utilizes both spatial and temporal
nature of videos. The network was first trained after data
augmentation with a cross-entropy loss, and then with a
specially designed generalization loss, which acts as a
regularization factor. The Maximum Mean Discrepancy
(MMD) distance among different domains is minimized
to improve the generalization property.
There are several works involving various auxiliary
information in the CNN training process, mostly focus-
ing on the detection of 2D attacks. Authors use either
2D or 3D CNN. The main problem of CNN based
approaches mentioned above is the lack of training data,
which is usually required to train a network from scratch.
One commonly used solution is fine-tuning, rather than
a complete training, of the networks trained for face-
recognition, or image classification tasks. Another is-
sue is the poor generalization in cross-database and
unseen attacks tests. To circumvent these issues, some
researchers have proposed methods to train CNN using
auxiliary tasks, which is shown to improve generalization
properties. These approaches are discussed below.
Liu et al. [30] presented a novel method for PAD
with auxiliary supervision. Instead of training a network
end-to-end directly for PAD task, they used CNN-RNN
model to estimate the depth with pixel-wise supervision
and estimate remote photoplethysmography (rPPG) with
sequence-wise supervision. The estimated rPPG and
depth were used for PAD task. The addition of the
4auxiliary task improved the generalization capability.
Atoum et al. [31] proposed a two-stream CNN for 2D
presentation attack detection by combining a patch-based
model and holistic depth maps. For the patch-based
model, an end-to-end CNN was trained. In the depth
estimation, a fully convolutional network was trained
using the entire face image. The generated depth map
was converted to a feature vector by finding the mean
values in the N × N grid. The final PAD score was
obtained by fusing the scores from the patch and depth
CNNs.
Shao et al. [32] proposed a deep convolutional
network-based architecture for 3D mask PAD. They tried
to capture the subtle differences in facial dynamics using
the CNN. Feature maps obtained from the convolutional
layer of a pre-trained VGG [33] network was used
to extract features in each channel. Optical flow was
estimated using the motion constraint equation in each
channel. Further, the dynamic texture was learned using
the data from different channels. The proposed approach
achieved an AUC (Area Under Curve) score of 99.99%
in the 3DMAD dataset.
Lucena et al. [13] presented an approach for face
PAD using transfer learning from pre-trained models
(FASNet). The VGG16 [33] architecture which was pre-
trained on ImageNet [34] dataset was used as the base
network as an extractor, and they modified the final
fully connected layers. The newly added fully connected
layers in the network were fine-tuned for PAD task.
They obtained HTERs of 0% and 1.20% in 3DMAD
and Replay-Attack dataset respectively.
C. Multi-channel based approaches and datasets for
face PAD
In general, most of the visible spectrum based PAD
methods try to detect the subtle differences in image
quality when it is recaptured. However, this method
could fail as the quality of capturing devices and printers
improves. For 3D attacks, the problem is even more
severe. As the technology to make detailed masks is
available, it becomes very hard to distinguish between
bonafide and presentation attacks by just using visible
spectrum imaging. Several researchers have suggested
using multi-spectral and extended range imaging to solve
this issue [35], [36].
Akhtar et al. [37] outlines the major challenges and
open issues in biometrics concerning presentation at-
tacks. Specifically, in case of face PAD, they discuss a
wide variety of possible attacks and possible solutions.
They pointed out that sensor-based solutions which are
robust against spoofing attempts and which works even
in ‘in the wild’ conditions require specific attention.
Hadid et al. [38] presented the results from a large
scale study on the effect of spoofing on different biomet-
rics traits. They have shown that most of the biometrics
systems are vulnerable to spoofing. One class classifiers
were suggested as a possible way to deal with unseen
attacks. Interestingly, countermeasures combining both
hardware (new sensors) and software were recommended
as a robust PAD method which could work against a
wide variety of attacks.
Raghavendra et al. [35] presented an approach using
multiple spectral bands for face PAD. The main idea is to
use complementary information from different bands. To
combine multiple bands, they observed a wavelet-based
feature level fusion and a score fusion methodology.
They experimented with detecting print attacks prepared
using different kinds of printers. They obtained better
performance with score level fusion as compared to the
feature fusion strategy.
Erdogmus and Marcel [39] evaluated the performance
of a number of face PAD approaches against 3D masks
using 3DMAD dataset. This work demonstrated that 3D
masks could fool PAD systems easily. They achieved
HTER of 0.95% and 1.27% using simple LBP features
extracted from color and depth images captured with
Kinect.
Steiner et al. [36] presented an approach using multi-
spectral SWIR imaging for face PAD. They consid-
ered four wavelengths - 935nm, 1060nm, 1300nm and
1550nm. In their approach, they trained an SVM for
classifying each pixel as a skin pixel or not. They defined
a Region Of Interest (ROI) where the skin is likely to
be present, and skin classification results in the ROI is
used for classifying PAs. The approach obtained 99.28
% accuracy in per-pixel skin classification.
Dhamecha et al. [40] proposed an approach for PAD
by combining the visible and thermal image patches for
spoofing detection. They classified each patch as either
bonafide or attack and used the bonafide patches for
subsequent face recognition pipeline.
Agarwal et al. [20] proposed a framework for the
detection of latex mask attacks from multi-channel data,
which comprised of visible, thermal and infrared data.
The dataset was collected independently for different
channels and hence lacks temporal and spatial alignment
between the channels. They have performed experiments
using handcrafted features independently in the multiple
channels. For PAD, the best performing system was
based on redundant discrete wavelet transform (RDWT)
and Haralick [41] features. They computed the features
from RDWT decompositions of each patch in a 4 × 4
grid and concatenated them to obtain the final feature
vector. The computed feature vectors were used with
SVM for the PAD task. From the experiments, it was
shown that the thermal channel was more informative
as compared to other channels obtaining 15.4% EER in
the frame-based evaluation. However, experiments with
5fusion could not be performed since the channels were
recorded independently.
In [42] Bhattacharjee et al. showed that it is possible to
spoof commercial face recognition systems with custom
silicone masks. They also proposed to use the mean
temperature of the face region for PAD.
Bhattacharjee et al. [43] presented a preliminary study
of using multi-channel information for PAD. In addition
to visible spectrum images, they considered thermal, near
infrared, and depth channels. They showed that detecting
3D masks and 2D attacks are simple in thermal and
depth channels respectively. Most of the attacks can be
detected with a similar approach with combinations of
different channels, where the features and combinations
of channels to use are found using a learning-based
approach.
Several multi-channel datasets have been introduced
in the past few years for face PAD. Some of the recent
ones are shown in Table I. From the table it can be seen
that the variety of PAIs is limited in most of the available
datasets.
D. Discussions
In general, presentation attack detection in a real-
world scenario is challenging. Most of the PAD methods
available in prevailing literature try to solve the problem
for a limited number of presentation attack instruments.
Though some success has been achieved in addressing
2D presentation attacks, the performance of the algo-
rithms in realistic 3D masks and other kinds of attacks
is poor.
As the quality of attack instruments evolves, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to discriminate between
bonafide and PAs in the visible spectrum alone. In
addition, more sophisticated attacks, like 3D silicone
masks, make PAD in visual spectra challenging. These
issues motivate the use of multiple channels, making
PAD systems harder to by-pass.
We argue that the accuracy of the PAD methods
can get better with a multi-channel acquisition system.
Multi-channel acquisition from consumer-grade devices
can improve the performance significantly. Hybrid meth-
ods, combining both extended hardware and software
could help in achieving good PAD performance in real-
world scenarios. We extend the idea of a hybrid PAD
framework and develop a multi-channel framework for
presentation attack detection.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
A Multi-Channel Convolutional Neural Network (MC-
CNN) based approach is proposed for PAD. The main
idea is to use the joint representation from multiple
channels for PAD, using transfer learning from a pre-
trained face recognition network. Different stages of the
framework are described in the following.
A. Preprocessing
Face detection is performed in the color channel using
the MTCNN algorithm [44]. Once the face bounding box
is obtained, face landmark detection is performed in the
detected face bounding box using Supervised Descent
Method (SDM) [45]. Alignment is accomplished by
transforming image, such that the eye centers and mouth
center are aligned to predefined coordinates. The aligned
face images are converted to grayscale, and resized, to
the resolution of 128× 128 pixels.
The preprocessing stage for non-RGB channels re-
quires the images from different channels to be aligned
both spatially and temporally with the color channel. For
these channels, the facial landmarks detected in the color
channel are reused, and a similar alignment procedure
is performed. A normalization using Mean Absolute
Deviation (MAD) [46] is performed to convert the range
of non-RGB facial images to 8-bit format.
B. Network architecture
Many of previous work in face presentation attack
detection utilize transfer learning from pre-trained net-
works. This is required since the data available for PAD
task is often of a very limited size, being insufficient
to train a deep architecture from scratch. This problem
becomes more aggravated when multiple channels of
data are involved. We propose a simpler way to leverage
a pretrained face recognition model for multi-channel
PAD task, adapting a minimal number of parameters.
The features learned in the low level of CNN networks
are usually similar to Gabor filter masks, edges and blobs
[47]. Deep CNNs compute more discriminant features as
the depth increases [48]. It has been observed in different
studies [47], [49], that features, which are closer to the
input are more general, while features in the higher levels
contain task specific information. Hence, most of the
literature in the transfer learning attempts to adapt the
higher level features for the new tasks.
Recently, Freitas Pereira et al. [50] showed that the
high-level features in deep convolutional neural net-
works, trained in visual spectra, are domain independent,
and they can be used to encode face images collected
from different image sensing domains. Their idea was to
use the shared high-level features for heterogeneous face
recognition task, retraining only the lower layers. In their
method they split the parameters of the CNN architecture
into two, the higher level features are shared among the
different channels, and the lower level features (known as
Domain Specific Units (DSU)) are adapted separately for
6Fig. 2: Block diagram of the proposed approach. The gray color blocks in the CNN part represent layers which are
not retrained, and other colored blocks represent re-trained/adapted layers.
different modalities. The objective was to learn the same
face encoding for different channels, by adapting the
DSUs only. The network was trained using contrastive
loss (with Siamese architecture) or triplet loss. Re-
training of only low-level features has the advantage of
modifying a minimal set of parameters.
We extend the idea of domain-specific units (DSU)
for multi-channel PAD task. Instead of forcing the rep-
resentation from different channels to be the same, we
leverage the complementary information from a joint
representation obtained from multiple channels. We hy-
pothesize that the joint representation contains discrim-
inatory information for PAD task. By concatenating the
representation from different channels, and using fully
connected layers, a decision boundary for the appearance
of bonafide and attack presentations can be learned via
back-propagation. The lower layer features, as well as
the higher level fully connected layers, are adapted in
the training phase.
The main idea used from [50] is the adaptation of
lower layers of CNN, instead of adapting the whole
network when limited amount of target data is available.
The network in [50] only has one forward path, whereas
in MC-CNN the network architecture itself is extended to
accommodate multi-channel data. The main advantage of
the proposed framework is the adaptation of a minimal
amount of network weights when the training data is
limited, which is usually the case with available PAD
datasets. The proposed framework introduces a new way
to deal with multi-channel PAD problem, reusing a large
amount of face recognition data available when a limited
amount of data is available for training PAD systems.
In this work, we utilize a LightCNN model [51],
which was pre-trained on a large number of face images
for face recognition. The LightCNN network is espe-
cially interesting as the number of parameters is much
smaller than in other networks used for face recognition.
LightCNN achieves a reduced set of parameters using a
Max-Feature Map (MFM) operation as an alternative to
Rectified Linear Units (ReLU), which suppresses low
activation neurons in each layer.
The block diagram of the proposed framework is
shown in Fig. 2. The pre-trained LightCNN model
produces a 256-dimensional embedding, which can be
used as face representation. The LightCNN model is
extended to accept four channels. The 256-dimensional
representation from all channels are concatenated, and
two fully connected layers are added at the end for
PAD task. The first fully connected layer has ten nodes,
and the second one has one node. Sigmoidal activation
functions are used in each fully connected layer. The
higher level features are more related to the task to be
solved. Hence, the fully connected layers added on top
of the concatenated representations are tuned exclusively
for PAD task. Reusing the weights from a network pre-
trained for face recognition on a large set of data, we
avoid plausible over-fitting, which can occur due to a
limited amount of training data.
Binary Cross Entropy (BCE) is used as the loss func-
tion to train the model using the ground truth information
for PAD task.
The equation for BCE is shown below.
L = −(y log(p) + (1− y) log(1− p)) (1)
where y is the ground truth, (y = 0 for attack and y = 1
for bonafide) and p is predicted probability.
Several experiments were carried out by adapting the
different groups of layers, starting from the low-level
features. The final fully connected layers are adapted for
PAD task in all the experiments.
While doing the adaptation, the weights are always
initialized from the weights of the pre-trained layers.
Apart from the layers adapted, the parameters for the
rest of the network remain shared.
7The layers corresponding to the color channel are not
adapted since the representation from the color channel
can be reused for face recognition, hence making the
framework suitable for simultaneous face recognition
and presentation attack detection.
IV. THE WIDE MULTI-CHANNEL PRESENTATION
ATTACK DATABASE
The Wide Multi-Channel presentation Attack
(WMCA) database consists of short video recordings
for both bonafide and presentation attacks from 72
different identities. In this section, we provide the
details on the data collection process, and statistics of
the database.
A. Camera set up for data collection
For acquisition of face data, different sensors were
selected to provide a sufficient range of high-quality in-
formation in both visual and infrared spectra. In addition,
3D information was provided by one sensor adding a
depth map channel to the video stream. Overall, the data
stream is composed of a standard RGB video stream, a
depth stream (called RGB-D when considered together
with the color video), a Near-Infrared (NIR) stream,
and a thermal stream. While the RGB-D and NIR data
are provided by an Intel RealSense SR300 sensor, the
thermal data is provided by a Seek Thermal Compact
PRO camera, both being relatively cheap devices aimed
at the consumer market. The hardware specifications of
these devices are described below.
1) Intel RealSense SR300 sensor: The Intel Re-
alSense SR300 camera is a consumer grade RGB-D
sensor aimed at gesture recognition and 3D scanning
(Fig. 3(c)). It features a full-HD RGB camera, capable
of capturing resolution of 1920×1080 pixels in full-HD
mode at 30 frames-per-second (fps) or 1260×720 pixels
in HD mode at 60 fps.
2) Seek Thermal Compact PRO sensor: The Seek
Thermal Compact PRO sensor is a commercial thermal
camera aimed at the consumer market (Fig. 3(b)). It
provides a QVGA resolution of 320× 240. This camera
range is primarily intended to be mounted on smart-
phone devices. The sensor is capable of capturing at
approximately 15 fps, with a non-continuous operation
due to an electro-mechanical shutter used to calibrate the
sensor at regular intervals (approx. 2s).
B. Camera integration and calibration
For multi-sensor capture, it is essential that all sensors
are firmly attached to a single mounting frame to main-
tain alignment and minimize vibrations. The setup was
built using standard optical mounting posts, giving an
excellent strong and modular mounting frame with the
Fig. 3: The integrated setup used for WMCA data
collection; a) rendering of the integrated system, b)
Seek Thermal Compact PRO sensor , c) Intel RealSense
SR300 sensor.
ability to precisely control the orientation of the devices,
Fig. 3.
To calibrate the cameras and to provide relative align-
ment of the sensors to the software architecture, we used
a checkerboard pattern made from materials with differ-
ent thermal characteristics. The data from this checker-
board was captured simultaneously from all the channels.
For the pattern to be visible on the thermal channel, the
target was illuminated by high power halogen lamps.
Custom software was then implemented to automatically
extract marker points allowing precise alignment of the
different video streams. Sample images from all the four
channels after alignment is shown in Fig. 4.
C. Data collection procedure
The data was acquired during seven sessions over an
interval of five months. The sessions were different (Fig.
5) in their environmental conditions such as background
(uniform and complex) and illumination (ceiling office
light, side LED lamps, and day-light illumination) (Ta-
ble II). At each session, 10 seconds of data both for
bonafide and at least two presentation attacks performed
by the study participant was captured. Session four was
dedicated to presentation attacks only.
TABLE II: Session description for WMCA data collec-
tion
Session Background Illumination
1 uniform ceiling office light
2 uniform day-light illumination
3 complex day-light illumination
4 uniform ceiling office light
5 uniform ceiling office light
6 uniform side illumination with LED lamps
7 complex ceiling office light
Participants were asked to sit in front of the custom
acquisition system and look towards the sensors with a
8Fig. 4: Sample images of a) Bonafide and b) Silicone
mask attack from the database for all channels after
alignment. The images from all channels are aligned with
the calibration parameters and normalized to eight bit for
better visualization.
neutral facial expression. If the subjects wore prescrip-
tion glasses, their bonafide data was captured twice, with
and without the medical glasses. The masks and man-
nequins were heated using a blower prior to capture to
make the attack more challenging. The distance between
the subject and the cameras was approximately 40cm for
both bonafide and presentation attacks. The acquisition
operator adjusted the cameras so that the subject’s face
was frontal and located within the field of view of all the
sensors at the desired distance. Then they launched the
capturing program which recorded data from the sensors
for 10 seconds.
D. Presentation attacks
The presentation attacks were captured under the
same conditions as bonafide. More than eighty different
presentation attack instruments (PAIs) were used for the
attacks most of which were presented both by a study
participant and on a fixed support.
The PAIs presented in this database can be grouped
into seven categories. Some examples can be seen in Fig.
6.
• glasses: Different models of disguise glasses with
fake eyes (funny eyes glasses) and paper glasses.
These attacks constitute partial attacks.
Fig. 5: Examples of bonafide data in 6 different sessions.
Top left is session one and bottom right is session seven.
There is no bonafide data for session four.
• fake head: Several models of mannequin heads
were used, some of the mannequins were heated
with a blower prior to capture.
• print: Printed face images on A4 matte and glossy
papers using professional quality Ink-Jet printer
(Epson XP-860) and typical office laser printer (CX
c224e). The images were captured by the rear
camera of an “iPhone S6” and re-sized so that the
size of the printed face is human like.
• replay: Electronic photos and videos. An “iPad pro
12.9in” was used for the presentations. The videos
were captured in HD at 30 fps by the front camera
of an “iPhone S6” and in full-HD at 30 fps by the
rear camera of the “iPad pro 12.9in”. Some of the
videos were re-sized so that the size of the face
presented on the display is human like.
• rigid mask: Custom made realistic rigid masks and
several designs of decorative plastic masks.
• flexible mask: Custom made realistic soft silicone
masks.
• paper mask: Custom made paper masks based on
real identities. The masks were printed on the matte
paper using both printers mentioned in the print
category.
The total number of presentations in the database is
1679, which contains 347 bonafide and 1332 attacks.
More detailed information can be found in Table III 3.
Each file in the dataset contains data recorded at
30 fps for 10 seconds amounting to 300 frames per
channel, except for thermal channel, which contains
approximately 150 frames captured at 15 fps. All the
3For downloading the dataset, visit https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/
wmca
9Fig. 6: Examples of presentation attacks with different
PAIs. (a): glasses (paper glasses), (b): glasses (funny eyes
glasses), (c): print, (d): replay, (e): fake head, (f): rigid
mask (Obama plastic Halloween mask), (g): rigid mask
(transparent plastic mask), (h): rigid mask (custom made
realistic), (i): flexible mask (custom made realistic), and
(j): paper mask.
channels are recorded in uncompressed format, and the
total size of the database is 5.1 TB.
TABLE III: Statistics for WMCA database.
Type #Presentations
bonafide 347
glasses 75
fake head 122
print 200
replay 348
rigid mask 137
flexible mask 379
paper mask 71
TOTAL 1679
V. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes the experiments performed on
the WMCA dataset. All four channels of data obtained
from Intel RealSense SR300 and Seek Thermal Compact
PRO are used in the experiments. Various experiments
were done to evaluate the performance of the system
in “seen” and “unseen” attack scenarios. In the “seen”
attack protocol, all types of PAIs are present in the train,
development and testing subsets (with disjoint client
ids in each fold). This protocol is intended to test the
performance of the algorithm in the cases where the
attack categories are known a priori. The “unseen” attack
protocols try to evaluate the performance of the system
on PAIs which were not present in the training and
development subsets. The “unseen” attack protocols thus
emulate the realistic scenario of encountering an attack
which was not present in the training set. The evaluation
protocols are described below.
A. Protocols
As the consecutive frames are correlated, we select
only 50 frames from each video which are uniformly
sampled in the temporal domain. Individual frames from
a video are considered as independent samples producing
one score per frame. A biometric sample consists of
frames from all four channels which are spatially and
temporally aligned.
Two different sets of protocols were created for the
WMCA dataset.
• grandtest protocol : The WMCA dataset is divided
into three partitions: train, dev, and eval. The data
split is done ensuring almost equal distribution of
PA categories and disjoint set of client identifiers
in each set. Each of the PAIs had different client
id. The split is done in such a way that a specific
PA instrument will appear in only one set. The
“grandtest” protocol emulates the “seen” attack sce-
nario as the PA categories are distributed uniformly
in the three splits.
• unseen attack protocols: The unseen attack pro-
tocols defined in the WMCA dataset contains three
splits similar to the grandest protocol. Seven unseen
attack sub-protocols were created for conducting
unseen attack experiments using leave one out
(LOO) technique. In each of the unseen attack
protocols, one attack is left out in the train and
dev sets. The eval set contains the bonafide and
the samples from the attack which was left out in
training. For example, in “LOO fakehead” proto-
col, the fake head attacks are not present in both
train and dev sets. In the test set, only bonafide
and fake head attacks were present. The training
and tuning are done on data which doesn’t contain
the attack of interest.
B. Evaluation metrics
We train the framework using the data in the train set,
and the decision threshold is found from the dev set by
minimizing a given criteria (here, we used a BPCER =
1% for obtaining the thresholds). We also report the stan-
dardized ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics [52], Attack Presen-
tation Classification Error Rate (APCER), and Bonafide
Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER) in the
test set at the previously optimized threshold.
To summarize the performance in a single number,
the Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) is used,
which is an average of APCER and BPCER. The ACER
is reported for both dev and test sets.
Apart from the error metrics, ROC curves are also
shown for the baseline and MCCNN method.
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C. Baseline experiment setup
Since a new database is proposed in this paper, base-
line experiments are performed for each channel first.
The selected baselines are reproducible and have either
open-source implementation [12] or re-implementation.
Three sets of baselines are described in this section.
1) IQM-LBP-LR baseline: This baseline consists of
Image Quality Measures (IQM) [21] for the RGB chan-
nel, and different variants of Local Binary Patterns (LBP)
for non-RGB channels. The detailed description of the
baseline systems is given below.
An individual PAD algorithm is implemented for
every data stream from the camera. The structure of all
PAD algorithms can be split into three blocks: preproces-
sor, a feature extractor, and classifier. The final unit of the
PAD system is a fusion block, combining the outputs of
channel-specific PAD algorithms, and producing a final
decision.
The preprocessing part is exactly similar to the de-
scription in Section III-A, except for color channel. For
the color channel, all three RGB channels are retained
in the baseline experiments.
The feature extraction step aims to build a discrimi-
native feature representation. For the color channel, the
feature vector is composed of 139 IQMs [12]. Spatially
enhanced histograms of LBPs are selected as features for
infrared, depth, and thermal channels [12]. Optimal LBP
parameters have been selected experimentally using grid
search for each channel independently.
For classification, Logistic Regression (LR) is used
as a classifier for color, infrared, depth, and thermal
channels 4. The features are normalized to zero mean
and unity standard deviation before the training. The
normalization parameters are computed using samples of
bonafide class only. In the prediction stage, a probability
of a sample being a bonafide class is computed given
trained LR model.
Scores from all PAD algorithms are normalized to
[0, 1] range, and a mean fusion is performed to obtain
the final PA score.
2) RDWT-Haralick-SVM baseline: In this baseline we
used the re-implementation of the algorithm in [20] for
individual channels. We applied similar preprocessing
strategy as discussed in the previous section in all chan-
nels. Haralick [41] features computed from the RDWT
decompositions in a 4× 4 grid are concatenated and fed
to a Linear SVM for obtaining the final scores. Apart
from implementing the pipeline independently for each
channel, we additionally performed a mean fusion of all
channels.
4We are pointing out that we investigated other classifiers such as
SVM but as no performance improvement was noticed we decided to
keep a simple method.
3) FASNet baseline: We also compare our system to a
deep learning based FASNet [13] baseline. The FASNet
uses the aligned color images as input for PAD task. We
reimplemented the approach in PyTorch [53] which is
made available publicly.
D. Experiment setup with the proposed MC-CNN ap-
proach
The architecture shown in Fig. 2 was used for the
experiments. The base network used is LightCNN with
29 layers. Further, to accommodate four channels of
information, the same network is extended. The embed-
ding layers from different channels are concatenated, and
two fully connected layers are added at the end. We
performed different experiments by re-training different
sets of low-level layers. The layers which are not re-
trained are shared across the channels.
The dataset contained an unequal number of samples
for bonafide and attacks in the training set. The effect
of this class imbalance is handled by using a weighted
BCE loss function. The weights for the loss function
is computed in every mini-batch dynamically based on
the number of occurrences of classes in the mini-batch.
To compensate for the small amount of training data, we
used data augmentation by randomly flipping the images
horizontally. All channels are flipped simultaneously to
preserve any cross-channel dependencies. A probability
of 0.5 was used in this data augmentation. The network
was trained using Binary Cross Entropy (BCE) loss using
Adam Optimizer [54] with a learning rate of 1× 10−4.
The network was trained for 25 epochs on a GPU grid
with a mini-batch size of 32. Implementation was done
in PyTorch [53].
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Experiments with grandtest protocol
1) Baseline results: The performance of the baselines
in different individual channels and results from fusion
are shown in Table IV. From Table IV, it can be seen
that for individual channels, thermal and infrared pro-
vides more discriminative information. RDWT-Haralick-
SVM in infrared channel provides the best accuracy
among individual channels. It is observed that the fusion
of multiple channels improves accuracy. Score fusion
improves the accuracy of both feature-based baselines.
Deep learning-based baseline FASNet achieves better
accuracy as compared to IQM and RDWT-Haralick
features in color channel. The FASNet architecture was
designed exclusively for three channel color images since
it uses normalization parameters and weights from a pre-
trained model trained on ImageNet [34] dataset. The
training stage in FASNet is performed by fine-tuning the
last fully connected layers. The usage of three channel
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images and finetuning of only last fully connected layers
limits the straight forward extension of this architecture
to other channels. In the baseline experiments, score
fusion of individual channels achieved the best perfor-
mance and is used as the baselines in the subsequent
experiments. From this set of experiments, it is clear that
the addition of multiple channels helps in boosting the
performance of PAD systems. However, the performance
achieved with the best baseline systems is not adequate
for deployment in critical scenarios. The lower accuracy
in the fusion baselines points to the necessity to have
methods which utilize multi-channel information more
efficiently.
2) Results with MC-CNN: The results with the pro-
posed approach in the grandest protocol are shown in
Table VI. The corresponding ROCs are shown in Fig.
7 5. From Table VI, it can be seen that the proposed
MC-CNN approach outperforms the selected baselines
by a big margin. From the baseline results, it can be
seen that having multiple channels alone doesn’t solve
the PAD problem. Efficient utilization of information
from the various channels is required for achieving
good PAD performance. The proposed framework uti-
lizes complementary information from multiple channels
with the joint representation. Transfer learning from the
pretrained face recognition model proves to be effective
for learning deep models for multi-channel PAD task
while avoiding overfitting by adapting only a minimal set
of DSU’s. Overall, the proposed MC-CNN framework
uses the information from multiple channels effectively
boosting the performance of the system.
The performance breakdown per PAI for BPCER
threshold of 1% is shown in Table V. From Table V
it can be seen that the system achieves perfect accuracy
in classifying attacks except for “glasses”. A discussion
about the performance degradation in the “glasses” at-
tack is presented in Subsection VI-B.
B. Generalization to unseen attacks
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the
system under unseen attacks. Experiments are done with
the different sub-protocols, which exclude one attack
systematically in training. The algorithms are trained
with samples from each protocol and evaluated on the
test set which contains only the bonafide and the attack
which was left out in training. The performance of MC-
CNN, as well as the baseline system, are tabulated in
Table VII.
From this table, it can be seen that the MC-CNN
algorithm performs well in most of the unseen attacks.
5 The score distributions from the CNN is bimodal (with low
variance in each mode) with most of the values concentrated near zero
and one, which explains the lack of points in the lower APCER values
in the ROC plots.
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Fig. 7: ROC for MC-CNN and the baseline methods in
WMCA grandtest protocol eval set 5.
Fig. 8: Preprocessed data from four channels for bonafide
with glasses (first row) and funny eyes glasses attack
(second row).
The baseline methods also achieve reasonable perfor-
mance in this protocol. However, MC-CNN achieves
much better performance as compared to the fusion
baselines, indicating the effectiveness of the approach.
The performance in the case of “glasses” is very poor
for both the baseline and the MC-CNN approach. From
Figure 8, it can be seen that the appearance of the glass
attacks are very similar to bonafide wearing medical
glasses in most of the channels. Since the “glasses”
attacks were not present in the training set, they get
classified as bonafide and reduce the performance of the
system.
The issue mentioned above is especially crucial for
partial attacks in face regions with more variability. For
example, partial attacks in eye regions would be harder
to detect as there is a lot of variabilities introduced by
bonafide samples wearing prescription glasses. Similarly,
attacks in lower chin could be harder to detect due to
variability introduced by bonafide samples with facial
hair and so on.
C. Analysis of MC-CNN framework
Here we study the performance of the proposed
MC-CNN framework with two different sets of
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TABLE IV: Performance of the baseline systems and the components in grandtest protocol of WMCA dataset.
The values reported are obtained with a threshold computed for BPCER 1% in dev set.
Method dev (%) test (%)
APCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
Color (IQM-LR) 76.58 38.79 87.49 0 43.74
Depth (LBP-LR) 57.71 29.35 65.45 0.03 32.74
Infrared (LBP-LR) 32.79 16.9 29.39 1.18 15.28
Thermal (LBP-LR) 11.79 6.4 16.43 0.5 8.47
Score fusion (IQM-LBP-LR Mean fusion) 10.52 5.76 13.92 1.17 7.54
Color (RDWT-Haralick-SVM) 36.02 18.51 35.34 1.67 18.5
Depth (RDWT-Haralick-SVM) 34.71 17.85 43.07 0.57 21.82
Infrared (RDWT-Haralick-SVM) 14.03 7.51 12.47 0.05 6.26
Thermal (RDWT-Haralick-SVM) 21.51 11.26 24.11 0.85 12.48
Score fusion (RDWT-Haralick-SVM Mean fusion) 6.2 3.6 6.39 0.49 3.44
FASNet 18.89 9.94 17.22 5.65 11.44
TABLE V: Performance breakdown across different
PAIs. Accuracy for each type of attack at at BPCER
1% is reported.
ATTACK TYPE MC-CNN @ BPCER : 1%
glasses 90.82
fake head 100.0
print 100.0
replay 100.0
rigid mask 100.0
flexible mask 100.0
paper mask 100.0
experiments—one with re-training different sets of layers
and another with different combinations of channels.
1) Experiments with adapting different layers: Here
we try to estimate how adapting a different number of
low-level layers affect the performance. The features for
the grayscale channel were frozen, and different exper-
iments were done by adapting different groups of low-
level layers of the MC-CNN from first layer onwards.
In all the experiments, the weights were initialized from
the ones trained in the grayscale channel.
Different groups of parameters were re-trained and are
notated as follows. The grouping follows the implemen-
tation of LightCNN from the authors in the opensource
implementation [55]. The name of the layers is the same
as given in 29 layer network described in [51]. The
notations used for the combination of layers are listed
below.
• FFC : Only two final fully connected (FFC) layers
are adapted.
• C1-FFC (1+FFC) : First convolutional layer includ-
ing MFM, and FFC are adapted.
• C1-B1-FFC (1-2+FFC) : Adapting ResNet blocks
along with the layers adapted in the previous set.
• C1-B1-G1-FFC (1-3+FFC) : Adapts group1 along
with the layers adapted in the previous set.
• 1-N+FFC : Adapts layers from 1 to N along with
FFC.
• ALL (1-10 +FFC) : All layers are adapted.
Here FFC denotes the two final fully connected layers,
and the rest of the names are for different blocks
corresponding to the opensource implementation of
LightCNN from [51].
The results obtained with re-training different layers
are shown in Table VIII. It can be seen that the perfor-
mance improves greatly when we adapt the lower layers;
however, as we adapt more layers, the performance starts
to degrade. The performance becomes worse when all
layers are adapted. This can be attributed to over-fitting
as the number of parameters to learn is very large. The
number of layers to be adapted is selected empirically.
The criteria used in this selection is good performance
while adapting a minimal number of parameters. For
instance, the ACER obtained is 0.3% for 1-2+FFC and
1-4+FFC, the optimal number of layers to be adapted is
selected as “2” (C1-B1-FFC) since it achieved the best
performance adapting a minimal set of parameters. This
combination selected as the best system and is used in
all the other experiments.
2) Experiments with different combinations of chan-
nels: Here the objective is to evaluate the performance
of the algorithm with different combinations of channels.
This analysis could be useful in selecting promising
channels which are useful for the PAD task. Additionally,
the performance of individual channels is also tested
in this set of experiments to identify the contribution
from individual channels. It is to be noted that color,
depth, and infrared channels are available from the Intel
RealSense SR300 device, and the thermal channel is
obtained from the Seek Thermal Compact PRO camera.
It could be useful to find performance when data from
only one sensor is available. We have done experiments
with six different combinations for this task. The com-
binations used are listed below.
1) G+D+I+T : All channels, i.e., Grayscale, Depth,
Infrared, and Thermal are used.
2) G+D+I : Grayscale, Depth and Infrared channels
are used (All channels from Intel RealSense).
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TABLE VI: Performance of the proposed system as compared to the best baseline method on the dev and test set
of the grandtest protocol of WMCA dataset.
Method dev (%) test (%)
APCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
MC-CNN 0.68 0.84 0.6 0 0.3
RDWT+Haralick
Score fusion 6.2 3.6 6.39 0.49 3.44
IQM+LBP
Score fusion 10.52 5.76 13.92 1.17 7.54
TABLE VII: Performance of the baseline and the MC-CNN system with unseen attack protocols. The values
reported are obtained with a threshold computed for BPCER 1% in dev set.
Protocol
RDWT+Haralick
Score fusion
IQM+LBP
Score fusion MC-CNN
test (%) test (%) test (%)
APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
LOO fakehead 4.82 1.5 3.16 4.12 0.64 2.38 0 0 0
LOO flexiblemask 28.06 0.03 14.05 56.36 0.8 28.58 5.04 0 2.52
LOO glasses 97.09 0.61 48.85 100 1.72 50.86 84.27 0 42.14
LOO papermask 4.01 0.49 2.25 31.51 1.17 16.34 0 0.7 0.35
LOO prints 0 0 0 3.52 1.08 2.3 0 0 0
LOO replay 10.03 1.51 5.77 0.15 1.53 0.84 0 0.24 0.12
LOO rigidmask 15.3 0 7.65 27.47 1.08 14.27 0.63 0.87 0.75
TABLE VIII: Performance of the MC-CNN when different combinations of layers were adapted.
Method dev (%) test (%)
APCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
FFC (FFC) 1.51 1.26 2.88 0 1.44
C1-FFC (1+FFC) 1.77 1.38 2.44 0 1.22
C1-B1-FFC(1-2+FFC) 0.68 0.84 0.6 0 0.3
C1-B1-G1-FFC(1-3+FFC) 1.1 1.05 1.11 0.05 0.58
C1-B1-G1-B2-FFC(1-4+FFC) 0.23 0.61 0.58 0.02 0.3
(1-5+FFC) 1.14 0.57 0.99 0.56 0.77
(1-6+FFC) 100 50 100 0 50
(1-7+FFC) 97.56 48.78 96.88 0 48.44
(1-8+FFC) 99.99 49.99 100 0 50
(1-9+FFC) 100 50 100 0 50
ALL(1-10+FFC) 100 50 100 0 50
3) G : Only Grayscale channel is used.
4) D : Only Depth channel is used.
5) I : Only Infrared channel is used.
6) T : Only Thermal channel is used.
The architecture of the network remains similar to the
one shown in Fig. 2, where only the layers corresponding
to the selected channels are present. Experiments were
done using the different combinations of channels with
the proposed framework. While training the model, the
embeddings from the channels used in a specific exper-
iment are used in the final fully connected layers. The
training and testing are performed similarly as compared
to experiments conducted in the grandtest protocol.
The results with different combinations of channels
are compiled in Table IX. It can be seen that the system
with all four channels performs the best with respect
to ACER (0.3%). The combination “CDI” achieves an
ACER of 1.04% which is also interesting as all the three
channels used is coming from the same device (Intel Re-
alSense). This analysis can be helpful in cases where all
the channels are not available for deployment. The per-
formance of the system with missing or with a subset of
channels can be computed apriori, and models trained on
the available channels can be deployed quickly. Among
the individual channels, thermal channel achieves the
best performance with an ACER of 1.85%. However, it
is to be noted that the analysis with individual channels
is an ablation study of the framework, and the network is
not optimized for individual channels. While doing the
experiments with individual channels, the architecture is
not MC-CNN anymore. The performance boost in the
proposed framework is achieved with the use of multiple
channels.
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TABLE IX: Performance of the MC-CNN with various
combinations of channels.
System dev (%) test (%)
APCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
G+D+I+T 0.68 0.84 0.6 0 0.3
G+D+I 0.78 0.89 2.07 0 1.04
G 41.14 21.07 65.65 0 32.82
D 10.3 5.65 11.77 0.31 6.04
I 3.5 2.25 5.03 0 2.51
T 4.19 2.59 3.14 0.56 1.85
D. Discussions
1) Performance: From the experiments in the previ-
ous subsections, it can be seen that the performance of
the proposed algorithm surpasses the selected feature-
based baselines. Transfer learning from face recognition
network proves to be effective in training deep multi-
channel CNN’s with a limited amount of training data.
From the experiments with different channels, it can
be seen that the performance of the system with all
four channels was the best. We have also tested the
same system in a cross-database setting. The data used
in this testing was part of the Government Controlled
Test (GCT) in the IARPA ODIN [56] project. In the
GCT data, it was observed that the system which uses
all four channels was performing the best. The addition
of complementary information makes the classifier more
accurate. The combination of channels makes the frame-
work more robust in general.
The experiments in the unseen attack scenario show
some interesting results. Even though the framework is
trained as a binary classifier, it is able to generalize
well for most of the attacks when the properties of
the unseen attacks can be learned from other types of
presentations. This can be explained as follows, the 2D
PAIs prints and replays can be characterized from depth
channel alone. Having one of them in the training set is
enough for the correct classification of the other class.
The same idea can be extended to other attacks which
need information from multiple channels for PAD. For
example, if we have silicone masks in the training set;
then classifying mannequins as an attack is rather easy.
A PAI is relatively easy to detect when it is distinctive
from bonafide in at least one of the channels. PAD
becomes harder as the representations across channels
become similar to that of bonafide. This makes the
detection of partial attacks such as glasses which occlude
a small portion of the face more complex. From the
above discussion, it can be seen that, if we have a wide
variety of sophisticated attacks in the training set, then
the accuracy in detecting simpler unseen attacks seems
to be better. This observation is interesting as this could
help to tackle the unseen attack scenario, i.e., if we train
the system using sufficient varieties of complex PAIs,
then the resulting model can perform reasonably well
on simpler “unseen” attacks. Further, the representation
obtained from the penultimate layer of MC-CNN can
be used to train one class classifiers/anomaly detectors
which could be used to detect unseen attacks.
2) Limitations: One of the main limitations of the
proposed framework is the requirement of spatially and
temporally aligned channels. Spatial alignment can be
achieved by careful calibration of the cameras. Achiev-
ing temporal alignment requires the sensors to be trig-
gered in a supervised fashion. However, the proposed
framework can handle small temporal misalignments and
does not have very stringent requirement on absolute
synchronization between channels, as long as there is no
significant movement between the frames from different
channels. Data from different channels recorded in mul-
tiple sessions, as in [20] cannot be used in the proposed
framework. In deployment scenarios, the time spent for
data capture should be small from the usability point
of view; synchronized capture between multiple sensors
is suitable for this scenario since it reduces the overall
time for data capture. Further, if the multiple channels
are not synchronized, face detection in the additional
channels is not trivial. Having spatial and temporal
alignment obviates the requirement of face detection
for all channels since the face location can be shared
among different channels. Data capture can be done
synchronously as long as the illumination requirements
for one sensor is not interfering another sensor and
there are no cross sensor interferences. More stringent
timing control will be required if there are cross sensor
incompatibilities.
From Table IX, it is clear that having multiple chan-
nels improves performance significantly. However, it
may not be feasible to deploy all the sensors in de-
ployment scenarios. In the absence of certain channels,
the proposed framework can be retrained to work with
available channels (but with reduced performance). Fur-
ther, it is possible to extend the proposed framework
to work with a different set of additional channels by
adding more channels to the proposed framework.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
As the quality of PAIs gets better and better, identi-
fying presentation attacks using visible spectra alone is
becoming harder. Secure use of biometrics requires more
reliable ways to detect spoofing attempts. Presentation
attack detection is especially challenging while presented
with realistic 3D attacks and partial attacks. Using multi-
ple channels of information for PAD makes the systems
much harder to spoof. In this work, a Multi-channel
CNN framework is proposed, which achieves superior
performance as compared to baseline methods. We also
introduce a new multi-channel dataset containing various
2D and 3D attacks tackling identity concealment and
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impersonation. The proposed database includes a variety
of attacks including 2D prints, video and photo re-
plays, mannequin heads, paper, silicone, and rigid masks
among others. From the experiments, it becomes clear
that the performance of algorithms is poor when only
the color channel is used. Addition of multiple channels
improves the results greatly. Furthermore, the unseen
attack protocols and evaluations indicate the performance
of the system in the real-world scenarios, where the
system encounters attacks which were not present in the
training set.
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